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Abstract 
 
This study aims at examining the relationship between largest blockholding and 
firm economic performance in Bangladesh, an emerging economy. It is found that there is a 
significant positive relationship between the largest blockholding and firm performance 
under both the accounting and market based performance measures. This study reveals that, 
largest blockholding, by narrowing the gap between ownership and control, allows the 
blockholder to add value to the firm. 
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1.  Introduction 
Due to separation of ownership and control in large corporations, there is a problem of aligning the 
interest of dispersed shareholders with that of management leading to so called agency problem (see 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976) also known as principal-agent (traditional) agency problem (Majumdar 
and Chhibber, 1999; Dharwadkar et al, 2000). A number of control mechanisms are suggested as part 
of checks and balances to reduce the principal-agent (or traditional) agency conflict and to achieve the 
firm’s objectives in a cost effective way. These include the external control mechanisms, such as 
market for corporate control or takeovers and internal control mechanisms, such as the presence of 
large shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), monitoring by board (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989) and 
contracting (Godfrey et al, 2006). As noted, the large shareholding is an important internal corporate 
governance mechanism among many other that can prevent the managers from self-opportunistic 
behavior and can improve the firm efficiency. Such ownership narrows the gap between the 
controllers’ (management) of the corporation with that of owners (shareholders). It helps in exercising 
the high degree of corporate control through exercising voting rights or representing in the board of 
directors (Prowse, 1994; Asian Development Bank, 2000; Coulton and Taylor, 2004). As the large 
shareholding is associated with the cost of non-diversifying that may lead to huge loss, it provides the 
investors with both the incentive and the ability to monitor and control the management (Prowse, 
1994). Therefore, such shareholders always tend to closely control the managers in the interest of 
themselves, which may in turn increase the firm performance. 
This study aims at investigating if the ownership by largest bockholder may influence the firm 
economic performance in Bangladesh, an emerging economy. The choice of Bangladesh is notable as 
over the past decades an overwhelming proportion of corporate governance literature has concentrated 
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on developed economies with sophisticated financial and legal systems (Ararat and Yurtoglu, 2006) 
and where there are many institutional similarities. There is a dearth of research and less concentration 
is given on corporate governance research in less developed and emerging economies (Gibson, 2003; 
Denis and McConnel, 2003; Ararat and Yurtoglu, 2006; Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). Needless to say 
there is a dearth of research on corporate governance practices in Bangladesh even though there is an 
increased interest on corporate governance practices by international donor agencies, such as Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and other international 
donor agencies (see Uddin and Choudhury, 2008; Siddiqui, 2010). The ‘Global Corporate Governance 
Forum’, an IFC multi-donor trust fund facility, argues that corporate governance is a powerful tool to 
battle against poverty (World Bank, 2007). In the context of Bangladesh it is so warrant that the World 
Bank has imposed conditions requiring the improvement of corporate governance practices in 
Bangladesh in order to get financial assistance (Solaiman, 2006). 
This paper is structured in several sections. Section 2 presents the corporate governance in 
Bangladesh. Section 3 presents the earlier studies on ownership structure and firm performance. 
Section 4 develops the hypotheses. Section 5 presents the research method. Section 6 presents the 
empirical results. The final section makes the discussion and draws a conclusion. 
 
 
2.  Corporate Governance in Bangladesh 
Unlike the corporations in Anglo-American countries, the corporate control mechanisms in Bangladesh 
are mostly insider oriented, such as ownership structure as the core investors own the significant stakes 
of shares within a single firm which is also known as ownership control approach and, in general, are 
the board of directors (Rashid and Lodh, 2008). There is a high degree of ownership concentration by 
founding family members leading to a high degree of ownership control. The presence of pyramidal or 
cross shareholding structure is not very common in Bangladesh; therefore, individual shareholdings are 
quite large. 
Due to highly concentrated ownership, lack of takeover regulations, a non-efficient market1, 
and due to huge transaction costs associated with the takeover process, some of the important external 
control mechanisms such as a market for corporate control or takeovers are largely absent in 
Bangladesh corporate sector (see for example, Franks and Mayer, 1990; Sarkar, et al, 1998; Asian 
Development Bank, 2000). Unlike the firms in Anglo-American countries, external board members 
(outside directors), financial analysts and financial press and media have a little role in monitoring and 
disciplining the firm management (see for example, Othman and Zeghal, 2006; Rashid et al, 2010). 
Therefore, boards and management are not fearful of being criticized. Finally, the role of other 
intermediaries, such as investment banks, financial analysts, credit rating agencies are less central in 
Bangladesh corporate sector. 
A notable intuitional difference in Bangladesh corporate sector from that of developed 
economy is that, due to diffuse share ownership, firms in developed economy appoints professional 
managers; many of them do not have ownership stakes within the firm. However, executives in 
Bangladesh are the family owners; many of them have large stake of ownership control or they are the 
representatives of the family owners. Sobhan and Werner (2003) noted that, in about 73% of the non-
bank listed companies, the boards are heavily dominated by the sponsor-shareholders who generally 
belong to one family-the father as the chairman and the son as the CEO. These owners have huge 
incentives and ability to monitor, such monitoring mechanism in Bangladesh reduces the need for a 
performance related pay (see for example, BanghǾj et al, 2010). Due to this, along with the absence of 
a liquid capital market, executive compensation in the form of stock options is absent in Bangladesh 
corporate sector. 
In early 2006, the regulatory body 'Securities and Exchange Commission Bangladesh' (SECB) 
announced the 'Corporate Governance Notification'. Among many other requirements, it requires the 
listed firms in Bangladesh to have Anglo-American type outside independent directors in their boards, 
to have a board size of 5 to 20 directors and an Anglo-American type audit committee to oversee the 
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audit functions. The non-compliance requires an explanation. This notification can so far be considered 
as the code of corporate governance best practices in the context of Bangladesh. 
The key agency conflict in the context of Bangladesh can be described as 'principal-principal' 
agency conflict. That is there is no real effective separation of ownership and control in the context of 
Bangladesh. The majority inside owners, who also sit in the board and management, tend to use inside 
information for personal gain or to diverge assets from minority shareholders which was seen during 
the event of stock market collapse in 19962. It is very hard for average non-controlling shareholders to 
achieve necessary votes to pose a threat to the poorly performed company management as there is no 
guideline regarding the 'ultimate controlling share ownership' in the Bangladesh Companies Act 1994. 
 
 
3.  Earlier Studies on Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
The evidence of ownership structure as the dominant corporate control mechanism came to light 
following the work of Demsetz (1983), where the ownership structure is described as “an endogenous 
outcome of competitive selection in which various cost advantages and disadvantages are balanced to 
arrive at an equilibrium organization of the firm” (p 384). There is a host of studies on corporate 
ownership structure and firm performance. Despite this plethora of studies, the study on largest 
blockholding and firm performance is relatively sparse. 
Lins (2003) found that the firm with a managerial control in the range of 5%-20% is associated 
with lower firm value, when the management group is also a largest blockholder. Managerial control in 
the range of 5%-20% does not affect firm value in the presence of non-managerial blockholders. 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) on 114 NYSE and AMEX listed companies reveal that Tobin’s Q is 
higher with majority corporate ownership and Tobin’s Q is lower with individual majority ownership, 
Barclay and Holderness (1991) on 97 NYSE and AMEX listed companies reveal that blockholding 
leads to a higher stock price, Shome and Singh (1995) on 92 U. S. firms reveal that external 
blockholders increase the Accounting return and market to book ratio. Ang et al (2000) on 1,708 small 
U.S. corporations from the NSSBF reveal that agency cost reduces with management ownership. 
Earnhart, and Lízal (2002) on 10,102 firms of Czech Republic during the period 1993-1998 reveal that 
ownership structure increases the environmental performance. Gugler et al (2003) on more than 19,000 
companies from 61 countries reveal that ownership structure improves the firm performance as 
measured by ROI within the countries with English origin legal system dominating capital market 
improves performance. Claessens, Djankov and Pohl (1996) on 706 Firms in Czech Republic for the 
period of 1992-1993 reveal that ownership structure increases firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. 
Khanna and Palepu (1999) and Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) on Indian firms investigated whether the 
blockholding in the form of banks and/or lending institutions improve firm performance. Khanna and 
Palepu (1999) reveal that the blockholding by domestic financial institutions are ineffective monitors; 
there are low firm performance for blockholding by domestic institutional investors and high 
performance for blockholding by foreign institutional investors. However, the study by Sarkar and 
Sarkar (2000) reveals that the blockholding by institutional investors have no influence on firm value. 
The earlier studies can be criticized on the premise that most of the earlier studies have been 
conducted within the context of developed or moderately developed economies, where there are many 
institutional similarities. This study extends the literature on ownership structure and firm performance 
in the context of an emerging economy. 
 
 
4.  Research Hypotheses 
Blockholding is a form of concentrated ownership in reducing the principal-agent conflicts or 
principal- principal conflict. Blockholding is not just the concentrated ownership; with the specific 
skills, wealth and expertise, blockholders have strong incentive to monitor the management (Barclay 
and Holderness, 1991; Gibson, 2003). Firms monitored by outside blockholders are substitute for 
incentive pay for executives (Kraft and Niederprüm, 1999). Blockholders may influence the 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics - Issue 65 (2011) 28 
management which increases the overall shareholder value in the form of ‘shared benefit of control’ 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003). It leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between blockholding and firm performance. 
 
 
5.  Research Method 
5.1. Sample Selection 
Based on the availability of company annual reports, this study considers 94 non-financial firms listed 
on the Dhaka Stock Exchange for the period of 2000-2009, representing 39.57% of the total listed 
companies as of 31st December 2009. These firms also represent 63.70% of the total non-financial 
companies listed and almost 55% of the market capitalization of total non-financial companies as of 
that date. The sample consists of variety of industries as per 'Standard Industrial Classification Codes' 
(SIC). Depending on the company's annual reports, a total of 844 observations could be made (94 firms 
in year 2000-2006, 92 firms in 2007, 82 firms in 2008 and 12 firms in 2009). 
The audited financial report was the basis for obtaining the company’s accounting information, 
such as EBIT, total assets, total liabilities and equities, preferred stock. The data were manually 
collected from company annual reports. Market value of the closing (year end) share price was 
collected from Dhaka Stock Exchange web page (www.dsebd.org), from the ‘Monthly Review’ of 
Dhaka Stock Exchange. The monthly market price of shares was collected from DataStream database. 
The ownership data were obtained from notes to the financial statement, 'Corporate Governance 
Compliance Report' of the respective company and from the ‘Monthly Review’ of Dhaka Stock 
Exchange. 
 
5.2. Variable Definitions 
5.2.1. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable in this study is firm performance under different performance measures. Two 
performance measures are considered in this study; such as Return on Assets (ROA) as accounting 
based and Tobin’s Q as market based performance measure. Consistent with Core et al, 1999, Rashid 
and Lodh (2008), Rashid (2010), Rashid et al (2010), Return on Assets (ROA) is calculated as the ratio 
of Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) and the book value of average net total assets (average 
net asset at the end of the year). Tobin’s Q, is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
replacement cost of their average total assets. 
 
5.2.2. Independent Variables 
Independent variable in this study is the largest blockholder (LBOWN). It is the percentage of shares 
owned by single largest blockholder. This single largest blockholder may be an insider or a financial 
institution. 
 
5.2.3. Control Variables 
This study considers a number of control variables. These are board composition, board size, board 
leadership structure, debt ratio, firm age, firm size, growth and risk. It can be argued that board has 
huge role in monitoring the management and disciplining the firm. A variable board composition 
(BDCOMP) is used as the percentage of outside independent directors to total directors in the board. 
Board size (BDSIZE) is the natural logarithm of total number of board members in a board. CEO-
duality (CEOD) is a binary, which is equal to be one (1) if the post of CEO and Chairperson is hold by 
same person, otherwise zero (0). Leverage may increase the firm's return on stock by minimizing its 
financing cost. Due to Jensen (1989) free cash flow theory, companies with high leverage ratio has an 
interest payment commitment and therefore are less able to keep funds. Debt ratio (DR) is measured as 
Total Debt to Total Assets, and calculated by scaling the total debt by average total assets. Liquidity 
may influence firm performance. Although excess liquidity may reflect the superior skills (Majumdar 
and Chhibber, 1999, p 296), it may negatively influence firm performance as excess liquidity may lead 
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to firm's assets tied up in non-revenue generating assets. A control variable liquidity (LIQ) is 
considered as current ratio. Firm age may influence the performance; the older firms are likely to be 
more efficient than younger firms (Ang et al, 2000). A variable ‘firm age’ (AGE) is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the number of years firm have been listed on the stock exchange. The firm size is 
an important variable influencing the firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Short and Keasey, 
1999); as the large firms have more capacity to generate internal funds (Short and Keasey, 1999; 
Majumdar and Chhibber, 1999); large firms may also have problems of coordination, which may 
negatively influence its performance (Williamson, 1967). This study considers the natural logarithm of 
average total net assets as ‘firm size’ (SIZE). Consistent with past studies (such as, McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Morck et al, 1988; Short and Keasey, 1999), this study considers growth (GROWTH) 
as the percentage of annual change in sales, which may also influence firm performance. Risk (RISK) 
is included as a control variable that may also influence firm performance and is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the standard deviation of stock returns over the year (12 months). 
 
5.3. Regression Model Specification 
In order to examine the relationship between the ownership structure and firm performance, the 
following model is developed, 
Yit=α+β1LBOWNi,t+tβ2BDCOMPi,t+β3BDSIZEi,t+β4CEODi,t+β5DRi,t+β6LIQi,t+β7AGEi,t+β8
SIZEi,t+β9GROWTHi,t+β10RISKi,t+εi,t 
Where, Yi,t is alternatively ROAi,t and Tobin’s Qi,t for ith firm at time t. LBOWNi,t is the percent 
of shares owned by largest block holders for ith firm at time t. BDCOMPi,t is the percent of outside 
independent directors to total directors for ith firm at time t. BDSIZEi,t is the board size (representing 
the total number of directors) for ith firm at time t, DRi,t is the debt ratio for ith firm at time t. LIQi,t is 
the firm liquidity for ith firm at time t. AGEi,t is the firm age for ith firm at time t. SIZEi,t is the firm 
size for ith firm at time t. GROWTHi,t is the firm growth in sales for ith firm at time t. RISKi,t is the 
natural logarithm of stock returns standard deviation for ith firm at time t. α is the intercept, β is the 
regression coefficient and ε is the error term. 
 
5.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in table 1. The descriptive statistics include mean, 
median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and Jarque-Bera statistics for normality test. The 
descriptive statistics reveals that average firm performance in terms of ROA is 5.8 percent which is 
ranging from negative 149.4 percent to 34.1 percent; average firm performance in terms of Tobin's Q is 
117 percent which is ranging from 17 percent to 826 percent. Average largest blockholding is 28.7 
percent which is ranging from 1 percent to 83.6 percent. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables (N=844) 
 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Jarque-Bera Probability 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.058 0.062 -1.494 0.341 0.097 214,864.200 0.000 
Tobin's Q 1.173 0.993 0.172 8.258 0.693 15,495.110 0.000 
Largest Block holding (LBOWN) 0.287 0.255 0.010 0.836 0.192 204.466 0.000 
Board Composition (BDCOMP) 0.038 0.00 0.000 0.333 0.070 420.635 0.000 
Board Size (Log) 1.778 1.792 1.099 2.485 0.310 8.476 0.014 
CEOD 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 140.510 0.000 
Debt Ratio 0.743 0.644 0.020 7.115 0.570 38,540.900 0.000 
Liquidity 1.484 1.131 0.021 31.245 1.947 550,944.100 0.000 
Firm Age (Log) 2.641 2.708 0.693 3.466 0.439 55.957 0.000 
Firm Size (LogTA) 5.987 6.042 2.443 9.857 1.475 2.269 0.322 
GROWTH 0.231 0.063 -1.000 4.597 3.651 21,614,636.000 0.000 
RISK 2.314 2.177 -2.262 6.780 1.556 4.655 0.098 
 
Average board composition in the form of representation of outside independent director is 3.8 
percent which is ranging from 0 to 33.3 percent. Average board size is 5.9 which is ranging from 3 
directors to 12 directors. There is a 46.7 percent incidence of CEO duality. Average debt ratio is 74.3 
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percent implying that 74.3 percent of the firm assets are financed by debt. Average current ratio is 
1.48; average firm age (in the form of listing at the stock exchange) is 14 years which is ranging from 2 
years to 32 years. Average firm size in the form of total assets is Taka 398.21 million which is ranging 
from Taka 11.47 million to Taka 19148.50 million. Average firm growth is 23.1 percent which is 
ranging from negative 100 percent to 459.7 percent. Average firm risk is 231 percent. 
To perform the statistical analysis, it is necessary to meet the assumptions of statistical analysis, 
such as normality, heteroscedasticity and multicolinearity. The assumption of normality is confirmed 
through a Normal Q-Q Plot, the Residual Test/Histogram-Normality Test as well both the 
'Kolmogorov-Smirnov' and 'Shapiro-Wilk'. No multicolinearity problem is seen in this study as the 
correlation matrix of the explanatory variables (not shown here) shows that there is no strong 
correlation among the variables as correlation coefficients are very small (less than 0.75 or negative) 
and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is less than 2. The Breusch–Pagan-Godfrey test suggests that there 
is a presence of heteroscedasticity in the model, which is corrected by using correction technique for 
unknown heteroskedasticity of White (1980). 
 
 
6.  Empirical Results 
The regression coefficients of the relationship between the blockholding and firm performance under 
different performance measures are presented in table 2 (panel A). The regression coefficients suggest 
that there is a significant positive relationship between largest blockholding and firm performance 
under both accounting (ROA) and market based (Tobin’s Q) performance measures. Board 
composition in the form of representation of outside independent directors has no significant 
explanatory power in influencing firm performance under both the performance measures. Board size 
has significant positive explanatory power in influencing firm performance under both the performance 
measures. CEO duality has a significant negative explanatory power in influencing firm performance 
under market based performance measure. Debt ratio, liquidity, age have significant positive 
explanatory powers in influencing firm performance under market based performance measure. Firm 
size, growth and risk have significant positive explanatory power in influencing firm performance 
under both the accounting and market based performance measures. 
It is argued that, the relationship between the ownership structure and firm performance is 
spurious because the relationship between these variables is industry-specific and no control has been 
included in the regressions for this possibility (Short and Keasey, 1999, p 95). Consistent with this 
argument and following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), McConnell and Servaes (1995), Short and Keasey 
(1999), further analysis is conducted to determine the robustness of the results by controlling the above 
regression model for industry and time effect. This is done by adding 'INDUSTRY Dummies' for two-
digit industrial classification (SIC) codes for the sector to which the firm belongs and 'TIME Dummies' 
for the year in which the observation is made. The following regression equation is arrived at: 
Yit=α+β1LBOWNi,t+tβ2BDCOMPi,t+β3BDSIZEi,t+β4CEODi,t+β5DRi,t+β6LIQi,t+β7AGEi,t+β8
SIZEi,t+β9GROWTHi,t+β10RISKi,t+ΩYEAR+γINDUSTRY+εi,t 
 
Table 2: Relationship between the largest blockholding and firm performance 
This table presents the summary results of the largest blockholding and firm performance under 
different performance measures. 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 Panel A 
(Before controlling for Industry and Time) 
Panel B 
(After controlling for Industry and Time) 
ROA Tobin's Q ROA Tobin's Q 
Intercept -0.001 
(-0.031) 
-0.770 *** 
(-6.503) 
-0.045 
(-0.726) 
-0.348 
(-1.454) 
LBOWN 0.109 *** 
(6.774) 
0.761 *** 
(6.789) 
0.107 *** 
(5.901) 
0.649 *** 
(6.565) 
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Table 2: Relationship between the largest blockholding and firm performance - continued 
 
BDCOMP -0.050 
(-1.222) 
-0.076 
(-0.340) 
0.035 
(0.596) 
0.167 
(0.684) 
BDSIZE 0.037 ** 
(2.385) 
0.459 *** 
(6.948) 
0.039 ** 
(2.290) 
0.347 *** 
(5.089) 
CEOD 0.000 
(-0.018) 
-0.086 ** 
(-2.943) 
0.008 
(0.885) 
-0.082 ** 
(-3.039) 
Debt Ratio -0.055 ** 
(-2.530) 
0.951 *** 
(22.481) 
-0.060 ** 
(-2.272) 
0.963 *** 
(23.524) 
LIQ -0.001 
(-0.517) 
0.018 ** 
(2.269) 
-0.002 
(-0.902) 
0.021 * 
(1.834) 
AGE -0.008 
(-1.314) 
0.142 *** 
(4.782) 
-0.001 
(-0.117) 
0.105 *** 
(3.332) 
SIZE 0.005 ** 
(2.250) 
0.031 ** 
(2.991) 
0.005 ** 
(2.450) 
0.019 * 
(1.743) 
GROWTH 0.038 *** 
(3.838) 
0.079 ** 
(2.263) 
0.032 *** 
(3.817) 
0.023 
(0.949) 
RISK 0.017 *** 
(10.696) 
0.090 *** 
(8.025) 
0.018 *** 
(9.996) 
0.088 *** 
(7.196) 
F Statistics 47.677 *** 175.495*** 16.523 *** 59.890 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.675 0.412 0.727 
The t-tests are presented in the parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.010; *** p < 0.001. 
 
The regression coefficients shown in table 2 (panel B) were not altered materially, except the 
firm growth under market based performance measure changed from significant to non-significant. 
 
 
7.  Discussions and Conclusion 
This study investigates the relationship between largest blockholding and firm performance in 
Bangladesh. It is found that there is a significant positive relationship between largest blockholding 
and firm performance under all the performance measures. The significant positive relationship 
between largest blockholding and firm performance primarily supports the Jensen (1993) ‘convergence 
of interest’ hypothesis; that is, the controlling shareholding may align the interest of managers with that 
of shareholders and thereby enhance firm performance. 
The theoretical implication of this study is that, this study supports the agency theory. This is 
because, the separation of ownership and control leads to the problem of aligning the interest of owners 
with managers that may be detrimental firm economic performance. It is to be noted that, largest 
blockholders, by narrowing the gap between ownership and control, could significantly influence the 
firm economic performance; thus, separation of ownership and control may be detrimental to firm 
performance. 
The practitioner/policy implication of this study is that legislative guideline for controlling 
share ownership may be required. It will to pose a threat to the poorly performed company 
management. This study also noted that, representation of outside independent directors in the board 
does not add any value to the firms in Bangladesh. While outsider representation in the board works 
well in many emerging economies (see for example, Tian and Lau, 2001; Luan and Tang, 2007), it has 
no role in the context of Bangladesh. Therefore, it may be imperative to direct the firms in Bangladesh 
to appoint ‘true’ outside independent directors, who will be able to add value to the corporate boards in 
Bangladesh. 
This study may have some limitations. For example, the data were mainly collected from the 
annual reports of the companies. As accounting standards are very poor in developing countries, the 
annual report may not truly represent a company’s state of affairs and performance. Further, the data 
were collected from a large number of observations of different corporate entities, ignoring the 
underlying differences in organizations and that no two organizations (even in the same industry) are 
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the same (Deegan, 2006). The extreme value of some observed variables such as EBIT may be skewed 
by the accumulated profits of a few firms for certain years and may severely impact the outcome of this 
study. 
 
Notes: 
1. The stock market in Bangladesh is considered to be non-efficient, as there is an information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders and irrational behaviors of insiders. Insiders tend to use sensitive information for private gain, 
which is seen during stock market turmoil in 1996 (also see note 2). 
2. There was an unusual growth of capital market at Dhaka and Chittagong Stock Exchange during 1996 due to a 
speculative bubble. It is alleged that, it started following the market manipulation primarily by foreign institutional 
investors with the help of local company directors and the local brokers-members syndicate. The price jump continued 
until the bubble burst in November 1996. 
 
 
References 
[1] Ang, J. S.; Cole, R. A. and Lin, J. W. (2000), Agency Cost and Ownership Structures, The 
Journal of Finance, 55 (1): 81-106. 
[2] Ararat, M and Yurtoglu, B. B. (2006), Corporate Governance in Turkey: An Introduction to 
Special Issue, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14 (4): 210-206. 
[3] Asian Development Bank (2000), Corporate Governance and Finance in East Asia, A Study of 
Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, A Consolidated Report, 
Volume 1, Manila: The Asian Development Bank. 
[4] BanghǾj, J.; Gabrielsen, G.; Peterson, C. and Plenborg, T. (2010), Determinants of CEO 
Duality in Privately Held Firms, Accounting and Finance, 50 (3): 481-510. 
[5] Barclay, M. J. and Holderness, C. J. (1991), Negotiated Block Traders and Corporate Control, 
The Journal of Finance, 46 (3): 861-878. 
[6] Claessens, S.; Djankov, S. and Pohl, G. (1996), Ownership and Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from Czech Republic, Paper Presented at the International Symposium on Capital 
Markets and Enterprise Reforms, Beijing, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
[7] Core, J. E.; R. W. Holthausen and D. F. Larcker (1999), Corporate Governance, Chief 
Executive Officer Compensation and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 51 
(3): 371-406. 
[8] Coulton, J. and Taylor, S. (2004), Director’s Duties and Corporate Governance, Have We Gone 
Too Far? Australian Accounting Review, 14 (1): 17-24. 
[9] Deegan, C. (2006), Financial Accounting Theory, Second Edition, Sydney: McGraw Hill 
Australia Pty Ltd. 
[10] Demsetz, H. (1983), The Structure of Ownership and The Theory of The Firm, Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26: 375-390. 
[11] Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985), The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences, Journal of Political Economy, 93 (6): 1155-1177. 
[12] Denis, D. K. and McConnell, J. J. (2003), International Corporate Governance, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38 (1): 1-36. 
[13] Dharwadkar, R.; George, G. and Brandes, P. (2000), Privatization in Emerging Economies: An 
Agency Theory Perspective, Academy of Management Review, 25 (3): 650-659. 
[14] Earnhart, D. and Lízal, L. (2002), Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate 
Environmental Performance, William Davidson Working Paper # 492 (August). 
[15] Franks, J. and Mayer, C. (1990), Takeover: Capital Market and Corporate Control: A Study of 
German, France and U. K., Economic Policy, 4 (10): 189-231. 
[16] Gibson, M. S. (2003), Is Corporate Governance Ineffective in Emerging Markets? Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38 (1): 231-250. 
[17] Godfrey, J.; Hodgson, A.; Holmes, S. and Tarca, A. (2006), Accounting Theory, 6th Edition, 
John Wiley and Sons Australia Ltd. 
33 International Research Journal of Finance and Economics - Issue 65 (2011) 
[18] Gugler, K.; Mueller, D. C. and Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003), Corporate Governance and the Returns 
on Investment, Finance Working Paper # 02, European Corporate Governance Institute. 
[19] Jensen, M. C. (1989), Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Harvard Business Review, 67 (5): 61-
74. 
[20] Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. J. (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4): 305-360. 
[21] Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. G. (1999), Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors, 
and Corporate Governance, NBER Working Paper # 6955, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Massachusetts. 
[22] Kraft, K. and A. Niederprüm (1999), Determinants of Management Compensation with Risk 
Averse Agents and Dispersed Ownership of the Firm, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 40 (1): 17-27. 
[23] Lins, K. V. (2003), Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, Journal of 
Financial and Quantities Analysis, 38 (1): 159-185. 
[24] Luan, C. and M. Tang (2007), Where is Independent Director Efficacy?, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15 (4): 636-643. 
[25] Majumdar, S. K. and Chhibber, P. (1999), Capital Structure and Performance: Evidence from a 
Transition Economy on an aspect of Corporate Governance, Public Choice, 98 (3-4): 287-305. 
[26] McConnell, J. J. and Servaes, H. (1990), Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and 
Corporate Value, Journal of Financial Economics, 27 (2): 595-612. 
[27] Morck, R. K.; Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1988), Management Ownership and Market 
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (1-2): 293-315. 
[28] Othman, H. B. and Zeghal, D. (2006), A Study of Earnings-Management Motives in the Anglo-
American and Euro-Continental Accounting Models: The Canadian and French Cases, The 
International Journal of Accounting, 41: 406-435. 
[29] Prowse, S. D. (1994), Corporate Governance in an International Perspective: A Survey of 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms among Large Firms in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, and Germany, Economic Paper # 41, Bank for International Settlements. 
[30] Rashid, A. and Lodh, S. C. (2008), The Influence of Ownership Structures and Board Practices 
on Corporate Social Disclosures in Bangladesh, in Tsamenyi, M. and S. Uddin (eds), Research 
in Accounting in Emerging Economies, 8: 211-237. 
[31] Rashid, A. (2010), CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Evidence from a Developing Country, 
Corporate Ownership and Control, 8 (1):163-175. 
[32] Rashid, A.; De Zoysa, A.; Lodh, S. and Rudkin, K. (2010), Board Composition and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh, Australasian Accounting Business and Finance 
Journal, 4 (1): 76-95. 
[33] Sarkar, J., Sarkar, S. and Bhaumik, S. K. (1998), Does Ownership Always Matter?-Evidence 
from Indian Banking Industry, Journal of Comparative Economics, 26 (2): 262-281. 
[34] Shome, D. K. and Singh, S. (1995), Firm Value and External Block Holdings, Financial 
Management, 24 (4): 3-14. 
[35] Short, H. and Keasey, K. (1999), Managerial Ownership and Performance of Firm-Evidence 
from UK, Journal of Corporate Finance, 5: 79-101. 
[36] Siddiqui, J. (2010), Development of Corporate Governance Regulations: The Case of an 
Emerging Economy, Journal of Business Ethics, 91 (2): 253-274. 
[37] Sobhan, F. and Werner, W. (2003), A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance in South 
Asia: Charting a Roadmap for Bangladesh, Dhaka: Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Available 
http://www.bei-bd.org/documents/cg%201.pdf (Accessed on 5th July 2005). 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics - Issue 65 (2011) 34 
[38] Solaiman, S. M. (2006), Recent Reforms and Development of the Capital Markets in 
Bangladesh: A Critique, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 41 (3): 195- 228. 
[39] Tian, J. J. and Lau, C. (2001), Board Composition, Leadership Structure and Performance of 
Chinese Shareholding Companies, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 18: 245-263. 
[40] Uddin, S. and Choudhury, J. (2008), Rationality, Traditionalism and State of Corporate 
Governance: Illustrious from a Less-Developed Country, Accounting Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 21 (7): 1026-1051. 
[41] White, H. (1980), A Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct 
Test for Heteroskedasticity, Econometrica, 48: 817-838. 
[42] Williamson, O. E. (1967), Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size, Journal of Political 
Economy, 53 (2): 123-138. 
[43] World Bank (2007), Corporate Governance: A Powerful Tool in the Battle against Poverty, 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
[44] Zahra, S. A. and Pearce II, J. A. (1989), Board of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model, Journal of Management, 15 (2): 291-334. 
 
